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 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the district court erred in holding that the minimum coverage 
provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Affordable Care 
Act”  or “ACA”) is not a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power. 
2. Whether the court erred in holding that the minimum coverage provision 
is not independently authorized by Congress’s taxing power. 
3. Whether, even assuming that the minimum coverage provision was 
invalid, the court erred in declaring that the Affordable Care Act in its entirety is 
invalid and in awarding relief to plaintiffs without standing. 
STATEMENT OF INTEREST1 
AARP is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to addressing the 
needs and interests of people aged 50 and older.  Since its founding in 1958, AARP 
has advocated for affordable, accessible health care, as well as improved quality of 
care and controlled healthcare costs.     
In response to the growing number of older people forgoing health care 
services and facing financial ruin due to health care and insurance becoming 
increasingly unaffordable and unavailable, AARP sought legislative solutions that 
                                                 
1  Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29, amicus certifies that all parties have 
consented to the filing of this brief; no party or party’s counsel authored this brief 
in whole or in part; and no person other than amicus contributed money intended to 
fund the brief’s preparation or submission. 
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would: protect Medicare benefits; reduce insurance rate disparities based on age or 
pre-existing conditions; reduce the rate of health care cost increases, including for 
prescription drugs; and eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse.  Since 2007 AARP has 
collected thousands of personal accounts and testimonials from members and 
nonmembers describing the emotional and financial devastation they experienced 
when they were unable to pay for health insurance, were declined for insurance 
due to a prior illness, were unable to pay medical bills, or worse, were unable to 
receive necessary treatment or medicine when sick.   
When Congress was debating health reform legislation, AARP’s advocacy 
focused on six key priorities: 1)  Guaranteeing access to affordable coverage for 
Americans age 50 to 64 in the individual market who have faced unaffordable 
insurance based on their age, pre-existing conditions, or health status; 2)  Closing 
the Medicare Part D prescription drug coverage gap or “doughnut hole” so people 
are not forced to choose between paying for necessary medication and paying for 
other needed expenses; 3)  Lowering drug costs by increasing availability of 
generic biologics, which are used to treat serious conditions like cancer, multiple 
sclerosis, anemia, and rheumatoid arthritis, and can cost as much as $10,000 or 
more per month; 4)  Reducing costly hospital readmissions through a Medicare 
Transitional Care Benefit, which helps people safely transition to home or another 
setting after a hospital stay, thereby preventing costly, unnecessary hospital 
 3 
readmissions; 5)  Increasing funding and eligibility for home and community based 
services for people with chronic conditions, which would save money, improve 
quality of life for individuals who need these services, and better enable them to 
live at home; and 6)  Helping low-income Americans so that people who saved a 
small nest egg can still receive assistance and help with premiums and out-of-
pocket health costs.2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
When the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) was enacted,  
45 million Americans did not have health insurance, primarily because they could 
not afford it, healthcare costs were outpacing the rate of inflation, and the growing 
cost of insurance and individuals’ contributions to it was far outpacing wages. In 
response, Congress enacted the ACA, a comprehensive law designed to reduce 
healthcare costs and ensure that every eligible person has access to affordable 
insurance.    
Under the current healthcare system, insurers in the individual market have 
adopted industry-wide practices to cherry pick healthy people, weeding out those 
not as healthy by systematically denying coverage, limiting benefits, and charging 
excessive premiums to individuals with pre-existing conditions or perceived to be a 
                                                 
2  See Comprehensive Health Reform Discussion Draft: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. (June 
23, 2009) (statement of Jennie Chin Hansen, President of the Board, AARP). 
 4 
high-risk.  People under the age of 65 without job based coverage have limited 
options but to attempt to purchase insurance on the individual market. However, 
for people approaching retirement, coverage through the individual market is 
unaffordable, if not completely unavailable.   
As people age, they are likely to have a prior or current health condition that 
insurers deem too risky to insure.  While 9% to 35% of 18 to 24 year olds have a 
pre-existing condition, 48% to 86% of people ages 55 to 64 have one.  For high 
risk applicants, insurers charge premium rates 20% to 80% above the base rate or 
refuse to issue a policy or issue a policy with an exclusion or elimination rider 
under which services for a specific condition are temporarily or permanently 
excluded.   
Congress heard countless tragic examples of un- and under-insured people 
who could not receive treatment for serious illnesses and people saddled with 
crushing medical debts as a result of having policies with high deductibles and co-
payments and annual lifetime limits.   
In addition to increased premiums based on pre-existing conditions, insurers 
use age rating when setting premium rates: 50 to 64 year olds are charged rates 
frequently 3 to 6, and as much as 11, times greater than their younger counterparts 
solely based on their age.  Even a healthy 50 to 64 year-old with no pre-existing 
 5 
conditions faces markedly higher rates than younger people.  Age rating puts the 
cost of insurance out of reach to many in the pre-Medicare age group.   
Although there is an actuarial basis for charging older people higher 
premiums, they are unable to afford the higher rates.  Among uninsured adults, 
median family income is virtually identical across all age groups; more than half of 
uninsured people age 55-64 live below 200% of the federal poverty line, making it 
extremely difficult for them to afford to purchase age rated private insurance.  
Because insurance is the gateway to receiving care, older people without 
coverage are at risk of declining health and at much greater risk of premature death 
than their insured peers.  Congress heard testimony that the status quo masks 
significant hidden cost to Medicare when millions of uninsured adults bring their 
health problems with them when they enroll in Medicare.  
Congress recognized that, among other things, creating a robust insurance 
pool is essential in order to expand coverage for people who have been shut out 
from the current system due to health status or age.  Private health coverage 
products “pool” the risk of high health care costs across a large number of people, 
both healthy and sick, permitting them to pay a premium based on the average cost 
of medical care for the group of people.  This risk-spreading function helps make 
the cost of health care reasonably affordable for most people.   
 6 
Congress therefore rationally concluded that expanding the risk pool would 
make insurance more accessible and affordable for those who have been unable to 
obtain coverage and care.  Including the minimum coverage provision, which 
begins in 2014, enabled Congress to include consumer protections in the ACA that 
will help millions of Americans obtain care and coverage, which in turn will 
substantially benefit the national economy.   
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Beyond the undisputed impact the lack of accessible and affordable health 
care has on the national economy, there is also a human toll that is paid by millions 
of Americans annually.  People 50 to 64, who do not have job-based coverage and 
are not eligible for Medicaid or Medicare, have especially been harmed.  They 
need more health services and are more likely to suffer from chronic conditions 
than their younger counterparts.  Yet, they face extreme obstacles to buying 
insurance on the private market due to industry-wide insurance underwriting and 
rating practices that discriminate based on health status and age.  The 
consequences have been dire.  Not only have too many become laden with a 
tremendous amount of debt at a time in their lives when they should be saving for 
retirement, but they have also suffered worse health outcomes, including premature 
death, than their insured counterparts.   Because they often forego or receive 
 7 
inadequate health care, the uninsured and underinsured enter Medicare sicker and 
in greater need of services than their insured counterparts.  Medicare, therefore, 
shoulders the burden of paying the costs for the services needed to care for those 
uninsured people once they enter Medicare.  
Below are examples from four people, among the thousands who provided 
their personal stories to AARP, describing their hardships and struggle to afford 
health care:  
Valerie D. from Portsmouth, Virginia (Sept. 17, 2010) 
When I turned 63 my insurer wanted to raise my rate to $934 a 
month, which I am solely responsible for paying. At the same time 
my doctor was trying to pin down a diagnosis for some hip pain 
I've been having. She wanted to do an MRI (cost $3000) but my 
insurance wouldn't cover it. She put me on a prescription drug to 
try and ease the pain; again the insurance company wouldn't cover 
it. The only thing it seemed they would give me a good rate on was 
my prescription for minor cholesterol problems. That drug was 
costing about $160/month. I couldn't get my MRI and they wanted 
me to pay $934 for this privilege! So, unfortunately I was forced to 
cancel my insurance and reinsure myself with an extremely limited 
policy. This does not cover my prescription, will not cover the MRI 
and is very limited in their drug coverage program. […] So I now 
pay for almost everything except limited doctor visits and my 
doctor is trying to control my hip pain until next year when I turn 
65 and will be eligible for Medicare. 
 
William M. from Mount Dora, Florida (Jan. 26, 2011) 
I am now approaching 62. When I turned 55 my health care and my 
wife's was covered by my work insurance. This ended with my job, 
two years ago. My COBRA insurance ended six months ago. This 
means that I have a little over three years (my wife four years) 
before Medicare even begins. We are left with only unpaid 
emergency room care and the cost being passed on to the insured. 
We are not able to get Medicaid because my wife still works. Both 
 8 
my wife and I have worked and carried health insurance for over 40 
years.  
 
Chris L. from Leicester, North Carolina (Sept. 17, 2010) 
I still haven't been able to get health insurance that I can afford. I 
live alone and just turned 64 this month.  I have had two heart 
attacks of which I have three stints. I have atherosclerosis and 
osteoporosis. No one will insure me at a reasonable rate.  My 
monthly income is very small also, so I can't afford any of the 
health insurance quotes I have seen. 
 
Sue B. from Decatur, Illinois (Jan. 19, 2011) 
I am 54 years old.  Shortly after changing jobs from one I'd been at 
eight years the insurance company on the new job [. . .] denied 
coverage for pre-existing conditions because I was still in the 
enrollment period of about three months. This caused me to have to 
withdraw from my IRA and pay the 10% penalty. This money had 
been my retirement savings.  I had to use it to pay the hospital bill.  
So in other words after paying premiums for eight years the so-
called insurance was not there when I needed it.   
 
I. CONGRESS HAD THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO 
ENACT THE ACA WHERE THERE WAS A RATIONAL BASIS  
FOR CONCLUDING THAT THE MINIMUM COVERAGE 
PROVISION WILL HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT ON 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE. 
 
When the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (“ACA”), was enacted in March 
2010, 45 million people across the United States did not have health insurance, 
primarily because they could not afford it; healthcare costs were outpacing the rate 
of inflation and the growing cost of health insurance and individuals’ contributions 
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to it was far outpacing wages.3 In response, Congress enacted the ACA, a 
comprehensive law designed to reduce healthcare costs and ensure that every 
eligible person has access to affordable health care.4   
Congress has broad authority to regulate interstate commerce, including 
activities that “substantially affect” interstate commerce, so long as there is a 
rational basis for concluding that the “class of activities” has a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).  
                                                 
3  Between 2000 and 2008, the cumulative increase in health insurance 
premiums grew over three times as fast as wage increases.  Diane Rowland et al., 
Health Care and the Middle Class: More Costs and Less Coverage, The Kaiser 
Family Foundation 1, 7 (July 2009), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/ 
upload/7951.pdf. 
 
4  As a result of the ACA, reduced healthcare costs and improved access to 
care have already been reported. For example, the 2010 Medicare trustees’ annual 
report states that “[t]he outlook for Medicare has improved substantially because of 
program changes” made from the ACA.  A Summary of the 2010 Annual Reports, 
Social Security and Medicare Bds. of Trustees, (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.ssa. 
gov/oact/TRSUM/ index.html; see also Paul N. Van de Water, 2010 Medicare 
Trustees’ Report Shows Benefits of Health Reform and Need for Its Successful 
Implementation, Ctr. on Budget and Policy Priorities (Aug. 16, 2010). 
 
Improvements in access to care include:  adult children up to age 26 
remaining on their parents’ insurance; people with pre-existing health conditions 
getting coverage through state or federal high-risk pools; rebates issued to help pay 
drug costs for Medicare beneficiaries stuck in the “doughnut hole”; lifetime 
insurance benefits caps banned; and insurance companies prohibited from 
withdrawing coverage to people when they get sick.  Drew Altman, Health 
Reform's Six-Month Checkup, The Kaiser Family Foundation (Sept. 23, 2010); 
Fact Sheet: The Health Care Law and Improved Health Insurance Practices, 
AARP (June 2010), http://www.aarp.org/health/health-care-reform/info-06-
2010/fact_sheet_health_law_improved_health_insurance_practices.html. 
 10 
Health insurance is such an activity.  U.S. v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 
64 S. Ct. 1162 (1944).  Regulating the nationwide healthcare system as a whole 
involves and affects interstate commerce, which includes the purchase of health 
insurance.  For example, in 2009, health care expenditures in the United States 
grew 4% to $2.5 trillion, or $8,086 per person, and accounted for 20% of gross 
domestic product (GDP).  National Health Expenditure Data Fact Sheet, Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, available at 
http://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/ 25_NHE_Fact_Sheet.asp. 
The millions of uninsured people burden the fragmented and dysfunctional 
healthcare system nationwide and strain the economy.  The Instability of Health 
Coverage in America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of H. Comm. on 
Ways and Means, 110th Cong. (Apr. 15, 2008) (statement of Diane Rowland, 
Exec. V.P. of the Kaiser Family Foundation) (“The Instability of Health Coverage 
in America”).  Congress found that the cost of providing uncompensated care to 
the uninsured in 2008 was $43 billion.  42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(F). These costs 
are paid for by health care providers who pass on the cost to private insurers, 
which pass on the cost to those who are insured.  Id.  
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II. THE ACA SOUGHT TO ELIMINATE THE UNAVAILABILITY  
AND UNAFFORDABILITY OF HEALTH INSURANCE FOR 
MILLIONS OF AMERICANS, ESPECIALLY 50 TO 64 YEAR 
OLDS WHO MUST PURCHASE HEALTH INSURANCE ON  
THE INDIVIDUAL MARKET. 
 
In 2009, 8.6 million 50 to 64 year olds were uninsured.  Sara R. Collins et 
al., Realizing Health Reform’s Potential: Adults Ages 50-64 and the Affordable 
Care Act of 2010, The Commonwealth Fund, 1 (Dec. 2010) (“Realizing Health 
Reform’s Potential”).  This was almost a 25% increase from the 7.1 million 
uninsured 50 to 64 year olds in 2007.  Gerry Smolka et al., Health Care Reform: 
What’s at Stake for 50- to 64-Year-Olds?  AARP Public Policy Inst., 1 (Mar. 2009) 
(“What’s at Stake for 50- to 64-Year-Olds?”).  Without health insurance coverage, 
an individual pays the full the cost of health services out of pocket.  Considering 
that it costs tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars for medical care for cancer, 
heart attacks, and numerous surgeries, only the wealthiest uninsured have the 
ability to afford care when a major illness or accident occurs.  See infra p16; David 
Himmelstein et al, Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a 
National Study, American Journal of Medicine, 122 Am. J. Med. 741 (2009). 
 Half of all Americans (54%) received employer-sponsored health coverage 
in 2006. Rowland, The Instability of Health Coverage in America, supra, at 11.5  
                                                 
5  With the U.S. economy now in the midst of a downturn, employee coverage 
is in jeopardy for many as unemployment levels climbed from 4.9% in December 
2007 to 9.5% in June 2009.  Rowland, Health Care and the Middle Class: More 
 12 
People under the age of 65 without job based coverage, have no option but to 
attempt to purchase health insurance on the individual market if they are not 
eligible for Medicaid or Medicare.6  However, for people approaching retirement, 
coverage through the individual health insurance market is often unaffordable, if 
not completely unavailable as they are often denied coverage.  Understanding 
Individual Health Insurance Markets: Structure, Practices, and Products in Ten 
States, The Kaiser Family Foundation (Mar. 17, 1998), available at http:// www. 
kff.org/insurance/1376-barrierspr.cfm (“Understanding Individual Health 
Insurance Markets”); Smolka, What’s at Stake for 50- to- 64 Year Olds? at 5. 
Insurers routinely deny coverage to applicants with a wide variety of prior 
health problems such as rheumatoid arthritis, chronic headaches, kidney stones, 
angina, heart disease, or stroke.  The Kaiser Family Foundation, Understanding 
Individual Health Insurance Markets, supra.  In recent decades, the unavailability 
of coverage for the near Medicare age segment has worsened.  According to a 2007 
                                                                                                                                                             
Costs and Less Coverage, supra fn 3, at 1.  In 2011, unemployment is at 9%, a 
continuing problem.  See The Employment Situation – January 2011, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, Dept. of Labor, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf. 
 
6  Most uninsured 50 to 64 year olds are not eligible either for Medicare, the  
federal health insurance program for people age 65 or older (and some disabled 
people under age 65 and people with end-stage renal disease), or Medicaid, a joint 
federal and state run insurance program for low-income people with young or older 
dependents or who are disabled. Gretchen Jacobson et al., Health Insurance for 
Older Adults:  Implications of a Medicare Buy-In, Kaiser Family Foundation, 1 
(Dec. 2009) (“Health Insurance for Older Adults”).   
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survey of 50 to 64 year olds who purchased or tried to buy a non-group health plan, 
45% found it very difficult or impossible to buy coverage they needed, 61% found 
it very difficult or impossible to buy affordable coverage, 39% were turned down, 
charged a higher price, or only offered coverage that excluded a preexisting 
condition, and 69% never bought a plan. Collins, Realizing Health Reform’s 
Potential, at 3. 
In response to the alarming number of uninsured people closed out of the 
healthcare system and the adverse impact it has on the national economy, Congress 
enacted the ACA to, among other things, increase availability and improve 
affordability of health insurance for millions of Americans, especially 50 to 64 
year olds, who must purchase health insurance on the individual market.  See 42 
U.S.C.A. § 18091(a). 
A.   People 50 to 64 Are Systematically Denied Coverage or Priced 
Out of the Individual Market Because of Their High Incidences of 
Pre-Existing and Chronic Conditions. 
 
Under the current healthcare system, health insurers attempt to avoid almost 
all risk.  This is particularly true in the individual market where insurers have 
adopted industry-wide practices “to cherry pick healthy people and to weed out 
those who are not as healthy.”  H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, at 990 (2010).  The 
individual market systematically denies coverage, limits benefits, and charges 
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excessive premiums to individuals with pre-existing conditions or those perceived 
to be a high-risk.  Id. at 981.  
As people age, they are likely to have a prior or current health condition that 
an insurer would deem too risky to insure.  While 9% to 35% of 18 to 24 year olds 
have a pre-existing health condition, 48% to 86% of people ages 55 to 64 have a 
pre-existing condition.  At Risk: Pre-Existing Conditions Could Affect 1 in 2 
Americans, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs. (HHS) (Jan. 18, 2011), 
http://www.healthcare.gov/center/reports/preexisting.html (“At Risk: Pre-Existing 
Conditions Could Affect 1 in 2 Americans”).  While 36% of 18 to 34 year olds had 
one or more chronic condition, the number rose to 77% for those 55 to 64. Steven 
Machlin et al., Health Care Expenses for Adults with Chronic Conditions, 2005, 
Statistical Brief  #203, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (May 2008). 
When someone applies for health insurance on the individual market, the 
insurance company conducts an initial underwriting review of the applicant, 
eliminating likely high cost applicants.  Non-group health insurers typically 
consider an applicant’s current health status, medical history, and other 
characteristics, such as age, that are indicators of future medical costs.  When an 
insurer determines that an applicant is high risk, the carrier often refuses to issue a 
policy or issues a policy with an exclusion or elimination rider under which 
services for a specific condition are temporarily or permanently excluded and/or 
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charges significantly higher premium rates.  Mark Merlis, Health Coverage for the 
High-Risk Uninsured: Policy Options for Design of the Temporary High-Risk 
Pool, 2 Policy Analysis, National Institute for Health Care Reform, 2 (May 2010). 
The increased premiums for people in the individual market with pre-existing 
health conditions or risk factors, called “rate-ups,” typically range from 20% to 
80% above the base rate depending on the applicant's medical history.  The Kaiser 
Family Foundation, Understanding Individual Health Insurance Markets, supra. 
Commonly used exclusion and elimination riders effectively leave people 
who have acute or chronic illnesses in the same posture as they would be with no 
insurance.  The problem of people who are under-insured is significant as 29% of 
people with insurance have inadequate coverage should they suffer a serious or 
catastrophic illness. H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, at 980 (citing to Health Insurance: CR 
Investigates Health Care, Consumer Reports (Sept. 2007)). 
Congress heard countless tragic stories of under-insured people who could 
not receive treatment for serious illnesses and were saddled with crushing medical 
debts as a result of having policies with high deductibles, co-payments, and annual 
and lifetime limits. 7  For example:  
 
                                                 
7  Illness and medical bills contribute to a large and increasing share of 
bankruptcies.  The cost for non-routine medical care is enormous.  David 
Himmelstein et al, Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a 
National Study, American Journal of Medicine, 122 Am. J. Med. 741 (2009). 
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Randy, 63 years old, Pennsylvania 
Following his diagnosis with Stage IV esophageal cancer, Randy 
had surgery to remove his esophagus and stomach. Radiation and 
intense chemotherapy followed. Randy quickly reached the 
$100,000 lifetime cap on his major medical coverage and now 
receives no further benefits. He has paid out of pocket for follow-
up scans and labs to monitor his condition. […]  Randy's only 
option, a guaranteed issue policy, includes a pre-existing condition 
exclusionary period of up to three years. […] Ultimately, Randy 
will have to wait two years to become Medicare eligible. He has no 
other choice. 
 
Kay, 61 years old, Florida 
Kay works part time at a large department store earning $13,000 
per year. She has insurance through her employer but quickly 
exceeded the plan's $25,000 annual maximum following her 
diagnosis with Stage II breast cancer. She has received eight cycles 
of pre-operative chemotherapy, had a lumpectomy with auxiliary 
lymph node dissection, and now needs radiation. Kay already has 
$40,000 in outstanding medical bills from various diagnostic tests 
that were not covered. Now she's been told that she cannot begin 
radiation unless she plans to bring $115,000 with her to the first 
appointment.  
 
The Instability of Health Coverage in America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Health of H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. (Apr. 15, 2008) (statement 
of Stephen Finan, Assoc. Dir. of Policy, American Cancer Society). 
 
B.   Age Rating Substantially Raises Standard Insurance Rates Based 
Solely on Age Making Insurance Unaffordable for People 50 to 
64. 
 
In addition to facing rate-ups based on pre-existing or chronic conditions, 50 
to 64 year olds are charged rates for insurance frequently 3 to 6, and as much as 11, 
times greater than their younger counterparts solely based on their age.  See Karen 
Pollitz et al., How Accessible is Individual Health Insurance for Consumers in 
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Less-Than-Perfect Health? Georgetown Univ. Inst. For Health Care Research and 
Policy, The Kaiser Family Foundation (June 2001); Len Nichols, Dir., Ctr. for 
Health Policy Research and Ethics at George Mason Univ., Comment to Age 
Rating: Battle of the Generations, National Law Journal Expert Blogs (Aug. 31, 
2009), http://healthcare.nationaljournal.com/2009/08/age rating-battle-of-the-
gener.php.   Even a healthy 50 to 64 year-old with no pre-existing conditions faces 
markedly higher rates than younger people.   
Because people’s health declines as they age, leading to increased claims, 
insurers use the applicant’s age, commonly referred to as age rating, when setting 
the applicant’s premium rates.  Health Insurance Rate Regulation, NAIC & the 
Ctr. for Ins. and Policy Research, https://www.naic.org/documents/topics_health_ 
insurance_rate_regulation_brief.pdf.  This practice puts the cost of health insurance 
out of reach to many in the pre-Medicare age group.  “For many older adults and 
older families, the higher out-of-pocket costs that come with greater medical use in 
older age, combined with high premiums due to steep age rating, would lead to a 
high burden of total health care costs relative to income.”  Linda J. Blumberg et al., 
Age Rating Under Comprehensive Health Care Reform: Implications for 
Coverage, Costs, and Household Financial Burdens, Urban Institute, 8 (Oct. 
2009). 
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Prior to the ACA, the health care rating system in the non-group market was 
largely unregulated.  When ACA was enacted, 33 states had no limit on ratings.  
Individual Market Rate Restrictions, The Kaiser Family Foundation, 
statehealthfacts.org (2010), http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp? 
ind=354&cat=7.  While several states imposed rate restrictions for the individual 
market, only six states limited  insurers from increasing standard rates based on 
age by ratios equal to or lower than the 3:1 age rating ratio limit in the ACA.8  See 
Julie Appleby, Health Insurance: How Much More Should Older People Pay? 
Kaiser Health News, Curbing the Age Gap Chart (Aug. 31, 2009), http://www. 
kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2009/August/31/age-rating.aspx.  The lack of rate 
limits across the states necessitated Congress to limit the rate disparities adversely 
effecting 50 to 64 year olds. 
The charts below prepared by AARP Public Policy Institute (PPI) contain 
premium rates in several states quoted from the ehealthinsurance.com website in 
June 2009 and April 2011.9  They illustrate that even before health status is taken 
                                                 
8  Starting in 2014, insurers may not vary rates by more than 3:1 for age. 42 
U.S.C.A. § 300gg(a)(1)(A)(iii).  See infra p 29. 
 
9   Ehealthinsurance.com is affiliated with eHealthInsurance Services, Inc., a 
private, for-profit company that aggregates and sells health insurance online for 
individuals, families, and small businesses.  It is licensed to market and sell health 
insurance in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, for more than 180 health 
insurance companies, offering more than 10,000 health insurance products.  
https://www.ehealthinsurance.com/about-ehealth-index.  
 19 
into account, a 60 year old will pay between three-to-seven times more than a 20 
year-old for the same plan. These quotes do not reflect the premiums that someone 
with pre-existing health problems would face or out-of-pocket costs for deductibles 
and cost sharing, such as paying co-payments or a percent of medical bills.  
The chart below reflects the rate disparities for older and younger purchasers 
of “best-selling” plans offered for July 1, 2009, from ehealthinsurance.com: 10 
 
                                                 
10  To get a sense of how rates for the same plan vary by age, PPI searched rates 
in the zip code where the AARP state office is located.   Rate quotes were sought 
for a male, non-smoker age 60, and then age 20.   For each location, PPI obtained 
an online quote for one of the plans that ehealthinsurance.com listed as a 
“bestseller” for 60 year olds. PPI then obtained a quote for the identical plan for 
the 20 year old.   These prices reflect rates prior to any medical underwriting for 
health status of the individual. 
 
The brief descriptions of the plans in the table are at a very high level.  Plans 
vary in their benefit features, which includes the annual deductible, coinsurance 
and/or copayments, network requirements, and drug benefits.  Rates for a 
particular plan reflect the design of the specific benefit package, the size and age 
range within the risk pool, and the underlying health care costs and benefit 
utilization of those in the plan’s risk pool.   As such, the rates reflect the prices and 
practice patterns in a geographic area and plan overhead.  
 
Depending on the state’s rate regulations for the individual market, an 
insurer determines the premium for an applicant based on the company’s rate 
methodology; premiums commonly reflect applicant’s age, gender, health,  
smoking status, individual/family status, and other allowed rating factors.   Plans 
that carry the AARP name are made available in most states, but were not included 
in this survey because the provider of those plans only offers them to AARP 
members age 50 to 64. 
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Ehealthinsurance.com Premiums 
State 60 yr old 
male 
20 yr old 
male 
Cost for 60 yr 
old relative to 20 
yr old 
 
A “Best Selling” Plan 
(Benefit packages are 
highly varied.  See fn 10) 
 
 
Monthly 
premium 
Monthly 
premium 
(Monthly 
premium for age 
60 is X times that 
for age 20)  
Arkansas $210 $41 5.1 times 
Humana Autograph 
Total/5000 Plus Rx 
Arizona $181 $38 4.7 times Blue Value 10000 
Delaware $294 $45 6.5 times Aetna PPO Value 7500 
Florida $286 $38 7.5 times 
Aetna POA OA Value 
5000 
Idaho $288 $66 4.4 times 
Regence Now/Select 
2500 
Iowa $216 $50 4.3 times 
Humana Autograph 
Share 80//5000 Plus Rx 
& Doctor Co-pay 
Kansas $195 $49 4 times 
Coventry One 
K1Q08A25025 30 (HSA 
Compatible) 
Kentucky $198 $49 4 times 
Anthem Blue Access 
Value $2000 
Michigan $347 $81 4.3 times Aetna PPO 1500 
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Montana $431 $125 3.5 times 
BCBS HDHP Montana 
Option I 
Nevada $196 $36 5.4 times 
Sierra Distinct 
Advantage PPO Plan4 
5000 
New Jersey $531 $170 3 times 
Horizon Basic & 
Essential EPO Plus 
New Mexico $224 $75 3 times Blue Direct Plan B 2000 
Oregon $193 $53 3.5 times 
Lifewise Wise Essentials 
7500 
Texas $231 $49 4.7 times 
Blue Edge Individual 
HSA Plan VII 5000 
Utah $159 $28 5.7 times 
Humana Monogram 
Total/7500 Plus Rx 
Washington $241 $67 3.6 times 
GroupHealth HealthPays 
HSA  2000 Individual 
Catastrophic 
West Virginia $311 $62 5 times 
UnitedHealth One 
Copay Seclect 70-5000 
Wyoming $381 $79 4.8 times 
Aetna WY PPO Value 
2500 
 
The chart below reflects the rate disparities for older and younger purchasers 
of “best-selling” plans offered for April 1, 2011, from ehealthinsurance.com: 
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Ehealthinsurance.com Premiums 
State 60 yr old male 
20 yr old 
male 
Cost for 60 
yr old 
relative to 20 
yr old 
 
A “Best Selling” Plan 
(Benefit packages are 
highly varied.  See fn 10) 
 
 
Monthly 
premium 
Monthly 
premium 
(Monthly 
premium for 
age 60 is X 
times that for 
age 20)  
Alabama $298 $73 4.1 times 
HumanaOne Autograph 
Share 80/5000 Plus Rx & 
Doctor Visit Copay 
Alaska $586 $130 4.5 times 
CeltiCare Preferred 
AnyDoc PPO 80/20 
Colorado $430 $124 3.5 times 
Rocky Mountain Health 
Plans SOLO Outlook 
1500 
Florida $382 $88 4.3 times 
Cigna FL Open Access 
Value 2500/80% 
Georgia $251 $56 4.5 times 
BlueCross Blue Shield 
Smart Sense Plus POS 
3500 
Ohio $224 $63 3.6 times 
Anthem SmartSense Plus 
30% 
South Dakota $516 $101 5.1 times UnitedHealthOne Plan 80 
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Although there is an actuarial basis for charging older people higher 
premiums, they often are unable to afford the higher rates.  More than half of 
uninsured people age 55-64 live below 200% of the federal poverty line, making it 
extremely difficult for them to afford to purchase age rated private insurance. 11 
Jacobson, Health Insurance for Older Adults, supra fn 6, at 3.     
An analysis of the March 2008 Current Population Survey found that among 
uninsured adults, median family income is virtually identical across all age groups. 
For example, the median family income for uninsured 18 to 24 year olds was 
$28,461, whereas it was $30,000 for uninsured 50 to 64 year olds.  Lynn 
Nonnemaker, PhD, Beyond Age Rating: Spreading Risk in Health Insurance 
Markets 3, AARP Public Policy Inst., Insight on the Issues I35, (Oct. 2009).  
Accordingly, when looking to the individual market to buy coverage, uninsured 
people age 50 to 64 are not better able to afford, compared to younger adults, 
premiums that are many times more expensive than the standard rates available to 
younger adults. See also, Blumberg, Age Rating Under Comprehensive Health 
Care Reform.  Considering the small income difference among ages, keeping 
premiums within a moderate range for all is a key to keeping them affordable for 
everyone over their lifetime.  
                                                 
11  In 2009 and 2010, gross yearly income of $21,660 for an individual was 
200% below the poverty line. Fed. Reg. Vol. 74, No. 14, Jan. 23, 2009, pp 4199; 
Fed. Reg. Vol. 75, No. 148, Aug. 3, 2010, pp. 45628. 
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III.  UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED PEOPLE SUFFER WORSE 
HEALTH OUTCOMES REQUIRING MORE INTENSIVE AND 
COSTLIER CARE WHEN THEY ENTER MEDICARE AT 65 THAN 
PREVIOUSLY INSURED PEOPLE.  
 
Because insurance is the gateway to receiving health care in the U.S., the 
uninsured and underinsured suffer the worse health outcomes or even premature 
death.  Jill Bernstein et al., Issue Brief, How Does Insurance Coverage Improve 
Health Outcomes? Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., 1 (Apr. 2010).  Uninsured 
people generally receive much less care, either preventive or for acute and chronic 
conditions, than insured people.  For example, uninsured adults are less likely than 
insured adults to receive preventive services or screenings, such as mammograms, 
pap smears, or prostate screening.  When people do not receive adequate 
prevention and screening, they are at an increased risk for developing serious 
illnesses and receiving delayed treatment when ill.  Id.    
Older people without coverage are even more at risk of declining health and 
at much greater risk of premature death than their insured peers.  J. Michael 
McWilliams et al., Health Insurance Coverage and Mortality Among the Near-
Elderly, 23 Health Affairs, 223-233 (2004).  One study showed that continuously 
uninsured people ages 52 to 61 were 63% more likely than insured people to have 
a decline in their overall health and 23% more likely to have a new physical 
difficulty that affected mobility such as walking or climbing stairs.  Even 
intermittently uninsured participants were at increased risk for declines in overall 
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health and mobility because of the periods in which they were less likely to have a 
primary care provider, more likely to delay seeking care, and more likely to go 
without needed care.  David W. Baker, MD, M.P.H. et al., Lack Of Health 
Insurance And Decline In Overall Health In Late Middle Age,  345 New Eng. J. 
Med. 1106, 1108 (2001), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/ 
NEJMsa002887.  Alarmingly, in 2006 an estimated 22,000 Americans died 
prematurely as a consequence of being uninsured.  Rowland, The Instability of 
Health Coverage in America, supra. 
Significantly, the large number of uninsured pre-Medicare age people costs 
Medicare greatly.  Uninsured people with deteriorated health conditions bring their 
problems with them when they become eligible for Medicare.  “Near-elderly adults 
who were uninsured required more intensive and costlier care in the Medicare 
program after the age of 65 years than previously insured adults.”  J. Michael 
McWilliams, M.D., et al., Use of Health Services by Previously Uninsured 
Medicare Beneficiaries, 347 New Eng. J. Med. 143-153 (2007).  Providing health 
insurance coverage for near-elderly adults reduces their health care use and 
spending after age 65.  Id. at 153.   
Although all previously uninsured Medicare recipients had higher utilization 
of health care services once they became eligible for Medicare, the impact and 
costs were far greater for those with hypertension, diabetes, heart disease, or 
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stroke, where prevention and routine care can prevent costly acute care 
hospitalizations and interventions. Id.  The uninsured with these chronic conditions 
reported 13% more doctor visits, 20% more hospitalizations, and 51% higher total 
medical expenditures from ages 65 to 72 than did the previously insured adults. Id. 
at 143.  
“Uninsured adults – particularly those approaching age 65 – sometimes 
defer necessary care until they qualify for Medicare, putting their health at risk and 
increasing costs to the Medicare program.”  Jacobson, Health Insurance for Older 
Adults; supra at 1, citing J. Michael McWilliams, M.D. et al., Impact of Medicare 
Coverage on Basic Clinical Services for Previously Uninsured Adults, JAMA 290, 
757-64 (Aug. 2003). 
Congress considered the financial impact on Medicare: 
 
The status quo masks hidden cost to the Medicare 
Program when millions of uninsured adults enroll in 
Medicare. Uninsured adults, particularly those with 
chronic medical conditions, have fewer visits to 
physicians and fewer hospitalizations than insured adults 
in similar health before age 65. After becoming eligible 
for Medicare, uninsured adults have a rapid increase in 
physician visits and hospitalizations that persist for at 
least seven years after age 65. 
 
Their care in the Medicare Program is thus more costly, 
because they reach age 65 in worse health and have 
more immediate and expensive medical needs than if 
they had been insured and well-treated in their fifties 
and sixties. If all adults in this age group had insurance 
coverage, the cost of covering them could be off-set by 
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better health and potential savings for the Medicare 
program. 
 
The Instability of Health Coverage in America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Health of H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. (Apr. 15, 2008) (statement 
of John Z. Ayanian, MD, Prof. of Med. and Health Care Policy, Harvard Med. 
School).  
 
IV. THE ACA’S CREATION OF A ROBUST INSURANCE POOL  
SPREADS INSURANCE RISKS, WHICH IN TURN ALLOWS FOR    
AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE INSURANCE OPTIONS FOR 
AMERICANS OF ALL AGES AND WITH CHRONIC OR PRE-
EXISTING HEALTH CONDITIONS. 
 
Congress recognized that, among other things, creating a robust insurance 
pool is essential in order to expand coverage for people who have been shut out 
from the current system due to health status or age.12  Private health coverage 
products “pool” the risk of high health care costs across a large number of people, 
both healthy and sick, permitting them to pay a premium based on the average cost 
of medical care for the group of people.13  This risk-spreading function helps make 
                                                 
12   In addition to expanding the risk pool to ensure affordable coverage options, 
ACA provides subsidies in the form of refundable and advanceable tax credits for 
low-to-moderate income people.  Advanceable tax credits allow individuals to 
receive assistance when purchasing insurance instead of waiting to be reimbursed, 
while refundable tax credits ensure that individuals are still eligible for assistance 
even when they do not have tax liability.  Beginning in 2014, with certain limited 
exceptions, individuals and families earning 400% of the poverty line or less will 
be eligible to receive these tax credits, so long as they do not have access to health 
insurance through an employer or other public health insurance program.  26 
U.S.C.A. § 36B(a)-(c). 
 
13  “Pooling” is the insurance industry practice of combining the insurance risk 
of individuals or groups in order to determine premiums. Hinda Chaikind et al., 
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the cost of health care reasonably affordable for most people.  Gary Claxton, Inst. 
for Health Care Research and Policy, Georgetown Univ., How Private Insurance 
Works: A Primer, The Kaiser Family Foundation, 1 (Apr. 2002).   
Congress therefore rationally concluded that expanding the risk pool would 
make insurance more accessible and affordable for those who have been unable to 
obtain coverage and care.   
By significantly increasing health insurance coverage, the [minimum 
coverage] requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will 
minimize this adverse selection and broaden the health insurance risk pool to 
include healthy individuals, which will lower health insurance premiums. 
The provision is essential to creating effective health insurance markets in 
which improved health insurance products that are guaranteed issue and do 
not exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold.  
 
42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I). 
 
Without the minimum coverage provision, premiums in the individual 
market would rise by about 11% since young healthy individuals would opt out of 
coverage.  Jonathan Gruber, Health Care Reform without the Individual Mandate, 
Ctr. for American Progress (Feb. 2011), available at http://www.americanprogress. 
org/issues/2011/02/gruber_mandate.html.  The CBO  estimates that removing the 
minimum coverage provision will cut the number of individuals newly insured in 
half (from 32 million to 16 million). Id.  Estimates regarding the amount premiums 
                                                                                                                                                             
Private Health Insurance Provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (PPACA), Prepared for Members and Comms. of Cong., Congressional 
Research Service, 13 (May 4, 2010). 
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in the individual market will rise without the minimum coverage provision range 
between 15 to 27%.  Id.   
Including the minimum coverage provision, which begins in 2014, enabled 
Congress to include consumer protections in the ACA that will help millions of 
Americans obtain care and coverage, which in turn will substantially benefit the 
national economy.  Among other things, insurers will no longer be able to deny 
people coverage because of preexisting health conditions or consider health status 
in setting premiums, helping to make coverage available and more affordable to 
those with health problems and pre-existing conditions.  42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg, 
300gg-1(a).  In addition, ACA significantly ameliorates the age rating disparities 
because insurers starting in 2014 will not be allowed to vary rates by more than 3:1 
for age.  Id. § 300gg(a)(1)(A)(iii).  For example, a premium for a 64-year-old man 
may not be more than three times higher than the same policy for a 20 year old 
man, thus improving the status quo by making premiums more affordable to 50 to 
64 year olds.  
Congress had the Constitutional authority to create a robust pool in order to 
achieve successful expansion of coverage options for the 50 to 64 age group, as 
well as others who have been priced out of the U.S. healthcare system, such as 
people with pre-existing conditions or who need treatment for chronic illnesses or 
disabilities. 
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CONCLUSION 
 For the forgoing reasons, Amicus AARP urges the Court to reverse the 
decision below. 
       Respectfully submitted, 
 
       /s/Stuart R. Cohen  
Counsel of Record 
       Stacy Canan 
       AARP Foundation Litigation 
         
Michael Schuster 
       AARP 
 
601 E Street, NW 
       Washington, DC 20049 
       202-434-2160 
 
Counsel for Amicus Curiae AARP 
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